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ABSTRACT 20	
Recent studies have demonstrated that financial incentives can improve driving behaviour but high-21	
value incentives are unlikely to be cost-effective and attempts to amplify the impact of low-value 22	
incentives have so far proven disappointing. The present study provides experimental evidence to 23	
inform the design of ‘smart’ and potentially more cost-effective incentives for safe driving in novice 24	
drivers. Study participants (n=78) were randomised to one of four financial incentives: high-value 25	
penalty; low-value penalty; high-value reward; low-value reward; allowing us to compare high-value 26	
versus low-value incentives, penalties versus rewards, and to test specific hypotheses regarding 27	
motivational crowding out and gain/loss asymmetry. Results suggest that (i) penalties may be more 28	
effective than rewards of equal value, (ii) even low-value incentives can deliver net reductions in 29	
risky driving behaviours and, (iii) increasing the dollar-value of incentives may not increase their 30	
effectiveness. These design principles are currently being used to optimise the design of financial 31	
incentives embedded within PAYD insurance, with their impact on the driving behaviour of novice 32	
drivers to be evaluated in on-road trials.   33	
 34	
 35	
 36	
 37	
  38	
3	
	
1. INTRODUCTION 39	
Despite significant improvements in road safety, road injuries remain the ninth highest cause of 40	
burden of disease and are responsible for more than 100,000 deaths per year across high-income 41	
countries such as Australia, Japan and the United States (IHME, 2016). For high-income countries, 42	
year-on-year improvements in road safety have become increasingly marginal (IHME, 2016) and 43	
achieving further reductions in road trauma will require design and scaled delivery of novel road 44	
safety measures (Stevenson & Thompson, 2014).   45	
The advent of in-vehicle telematics with GPS-tracking has made possible the accurate and continuous 46	
monitoring of risky driving behaviours including distance travelled, speeding, hard acceleration / 47	
deceleration, and night-time driving (Horrey et al, 2012). While this technology is now mature (Chang 48	
& Fan, 2016) and has found application for monitoring driving behaviour in commercial fleets and 49	
pay-as-you-drive (PAYD) insurance for private vehicles (Greaves & Fifer, 2011; NCTCG, 2008), 50	
there remains an opportunity for improvements and for delivery-at-scale of road-safety measures 51	
designed around in-vehicle telematics systems (Stevenson & Thompson, 2014). These opportunities 52	
include linking trip data from in-vehicle telematics with other ‘big data’ to predict crash risk 53	
(McLaughlin & Hankey, 2015), real-time in-vehicle alerts and/or automated throttle control via 54	
intelligent speed adaptation systems (e.g. Reagan et al, 2013), delayed or immediate feedback via a 55	
smart-phone or web-interface (e.g. Dijksterhuis et al, 2015), and financial incentives that reward good 56	
driving behaviours and/or impose penalties for risky driving behaviours (e.g. Bolderdijk et al, 2011).    57	
The evidence regarding the effectiveness of incentives for safe driving has historically been limited to 58	
the impact of speed cameras, drink-driving legislation and the associated risks of financial penalty 59	
(Avineri et al, 2009). Recent studies have evaluated the impact of direct incentives for safe driving 60	
including exchangeable tokens plus feedback for safe on-road driving (Mazureck & van Hettem, 61	
2006), exchangeable tokens plus/minus feedback for decreased speeding in simulated driving 62	
scenarios (Mullen et al, 2015), financial incentives plus/minus feedback for reductions in on-road 63	
speeding (Reagan et al, 2013), and the effect of behaviour-based and mileage-based PAYD vehicle 64	
insurance (or similarly structured incentives) on on-road driving behaviour (Agerholm et al, 2008; 65	
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Bolderdijk et al, 2011; Bolderdijk & Steg, 2011; Greaves & Fifer, 2011; Lahrmann et al, 2012; 66	
NCTCG, 2008) and in simulated driving scenarios (Dijksterhuis et al, 2015).  67	
Early trials of PAYD incentives offered large monetary rewards in return for changes in driving 68	
behaviour (Bolderdijk & Steg, 2011; Greaves & Fifer, 2011). For example, one study offered up to 69	
€50 per month for keeping to the speed limit, reductions in distance travelled and reductions in 70	
weekend night-time driving; resulting in significant reductions in the percentage of total distance 71	
travelled at ≥6% above the local speed limit (Bolderdijk & Steg, 2011). While this suggests that 72	
financial incentives can influence driving behaviour, the large monetary rewards used in these studies 73	
“may not be economically feasible for insurance companies” (Bolderdijk & Steg, 2011 p18); leading 74	
some stakeholders to call for the design of ‘smarter’ incentives that could achieve similar shifts in 75	
behaviour but at a much lower cost. 76	
Recent studies have demonstrated that low-value incentives can be effective when combined with 77	
feedback but attempts to amplify the effects of these low-value incentives have proven disappointing 78	
(Dijksterhuis et al, 2015). Specifically, Dijksterhuis et al (2015) combined low-value PAYD 79	
incentives (capped at €3 per simulator run) and in-car feedback (providing a running total of rewards 80	
and penalties during simulator runs) with the aim of increasing the immediacy of financial 81	
consequences arising from participants’ driving behaviour. While the combination of feedback and 82	
low-value PAYD incentives produced significant improvements in driving behaviour when compared 83	
to untreated controls, varying the immediacy of feedback made little difference (€0.01/minute 84	
difference in payoffs between immediate and delayed feedback groups after feedback, equating to a 85	
€0.26 difference in payoffs for an average simulator run). Dijksterhuis et al (2015) concluded that 86	
efforts to improve the effectiveness of PAYD incentives may yet prove fruitful but that these efforts 87	
should now turn to factors other than the immediacy of feedback (such as certainty of feedback).     88	
More generally, designing ‘smart’ and potentially more cost-effective incentives may be difficult to 89	
achieve in practice. Evidence from behavioural economics suggests that offering a low-value reward 90	
can have the perverse effect (contrary to that which was intended) of reducing the desired behaviour 91	
(Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Mellstrom & Johannesson, 2008). Specifically, there is a risk that an 92	
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individual’s intrinsic motivation for safe driving will be 'crowded out' (eroded or displaced) by 93	
extrinsic sources of motivation such as monetary rewards. A number of explanations for this 94	
‘motivational crowding-out’ have been suggested in the literature including information 95	
communicated by incentives and the reputational consequences of accepting payment. For example, 96	
Gneezy et al (2011) suggests that motivational crowding-out may be linked to the informational 97	
content of the reward; where an offer of monetary rewards could be interpreted as a signal that safe 98	
driving is difficult or unpleasant and so has to be paid for, or where the magnitude of the reward 99	
indicates the (unexpectedly low) social value of the behaviour. Alternatively, motivational crowding-100	
out may be linked to the reputational value that an individual receives from adopting the target 101	
behaviour. When monetary rewards are present, drivers who would otherwise strive to maintain a 102	
reputation for safe driving as a signal of their concern for others, or of their community mindedness, 103	
can no longer distinguish themselves from drivers who adopt safe driving behaviours for more selfish 104	
reasons (i.e. payment). Put simply, intrinsically motivated ‘safe drivers’ may be less motivated to 105	
maintain the incentivised behaviour if safe driving carries no reputational value or – worse still – 106	
carries the implication that a ‘safe driver’ is ‘in it for the money’. Motivational crowding out is likely 107	
to be much more problematic for low-value rewards simply because low-value rewards may be too 108	
small to compensate for any loss of intrinsic motivation (Culyer, 1977; Mellstrom & Johannesson, 109	
2008; Titmuss, 1970).  110	
It should be emphasised that the potential for motivational crowding out does not mean that monetary 111	
rewards cannot work. For individuals with low or no intrinsic motivation for safe driving, even very 112	
low-value rewards may still be effective because "...a crowding-out effect cannot occur... (where) 113	
participants have no intrinsic motivation to begin with" (Frey & Jegen, 2001 p597). For individuals 114	
with a stronger intrinsic motivation for safe driving, designing ‘smart’ incentives requires further 115	
information regarding the dollar-value that would be required to compensate for any loss of intrinsic 116	
motivation. Several studies provide empirical support for the effectiveness of monetary rewards in 117	
situations where participation or effort is subject to motivational crowding out, but only if the dollar-118	
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value is above the threshold where intrinsic motivation has been completely crowded-out (Gneezy & 119	
Rustichini, 2000; Heyman & Ariely, 2004).  120	
Just as further information regarding the presence and extent of motivational crowding-out should 121	
assist in fine-tuning financial incentives, there may be scope to vary other features of an incentive to 122	
improve cost-effectiveness. Of particular relevance for the present study, incentives may be more 123	
effective when they exploit loss aversion and gain/loss asymmetry (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 124	
Loss aversion and gain/loss asymmetry are pervasive characteristics of preferences (Knetsch & Wong, 125	
2009), with ratios of willingness to accept (WTA) to willingness to pay (WTP) well in excess of unity 126	
for private goods such as mugs, chocolate or hockey tickets and for public goods like environmental 127	
amenity or public infrastructure (Bischoff, 2008). Gain/loss asymmetry would imply that loss of a 128	
discount or upfront payment will have a much larger impact on driving behaviour than a reward or 129	
bonus of the same dollar value; with clear implications for the design of ‘smarter’ incentives. Previous 130	
tests of gain / loss asymmetry in PAYD schemes with large monetary rewards (up to €50 per month) 131	
found no significant difference between gain and loss frames (Bolderdijk et al, 2011).  132	
This study provides empirical evidence to inform the design of ‘smart’ and potentially more cost-133	
effective incentives for safe driving in novice drivers. Specifically, the study was designed to evaluate 134	
the practical significance of motivational crowding out when offering low-value financial incentives 135	
for safe driving, and the extent to which gain/loss asymmetry may be exploited to amplify the 136	
effectiveness of low-value financial incentives.  137	
2. MATERIALS & METHODS 138	
2.1 Study design & hypotheses  139	
An experimental design was applied to estimate the effect of (i) financial incentives versus no 140	
financial incentive, (ii) higher-value versus lower-value financial incentives, and (iii) penalties versus 141	
rewards, on risky driving behaviours among novice drivers in a simulated environment. Here, the term 142	
penalties is used to refer to the loss of an upfront payment deposited into a ‘safe driving account’ (see 143	
Table 1). Participants’ driving behaviours (including exceeding the posted speed limit, hard braking 144	
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and excessive swerving) were observed in simulated driving scenarios designed to replicate the 145	
experience of driving on local roads under local conditions.  146	
To identify the effect of financial incentives versus no financial incentive, the experiment included a 147	
pre/post contrast wherein we observed participants’ driving behaviour at baseline under the ‘no 148	
incentive’ condition (baseline simulator run) and then at follow-up under the ‘financial incentive’ 149	
conditions (experimental simulator run). Drivers were randomised to one of four financial incentives: 150	
high-value penalty (HP); low-value penalty (LP); high-value reward (HR); low-value reward (LR); 151	
allowing us to compare high-value versus low-value incentives, penalties versus rewards and to test 152	
specific hypotheses regarding motivational crowding out and gain/loss asymmetry.  153	
To test for motivational crowding-out, we evaluated whether providing financial incentives had the 154	
perverse effect of increasing the proportion of the population participating in risky behaviours; 155	
reflecting a shift in behaviour among initially safe drivers. Here, participation refers to whether we 156	
observe a non-zero level of the relevant behaviour (as distinct to non-participation, a zero level of the 157	
relevant behaviour). We hypothesised that financial incentives would increase participation in risky 158	
behaviours (consistent with motivational crowding out) and that this increase would be larger for low-159	
value incentives than for high-value incentives.  160	
To evaluate the practical significance of motivational crowding out, we evaluated the impact of 161	
incentives on the level of risky driving behaviours. We hypothesised that financial incentives would 162	
decrease the level of risky driving behaviours when averaged across all novice drivers and that high-163	
value incentives would provoke a larger decrease than low-value incentives. That is to say, we 164	
hypothesised that – irrespective of the existence of motivational crowding out – incentives will still 165	
have the net effect of reducing risky behaviours when averaged across all novice drivers and that the 166	
usual relationship between price and quantity will prevail (pay more, get more).  167	
Finally, to evaluate the extent of gain/loss asymmetry, we compared the impact of penalties 168	
(deductions from a ‘safe driving account’) and otherwise equivalent rewards on the level of risky 169	
driving behaviours. We hypothesised that penalties would be more effective than an otherwise 170	
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equivalent reward (consistent with gain/loss asymmetry) in decreasing the level of risky driving 171	
behaviours.  172	
2.2  Recruitment & sample selection  173	
Potential participants were recruited via online classified advertisements and the strategic 174	
placement/distribution of flyers (see Supplementary Materials, File S1) at various sites in and around 175	
a university campus in Perth, Western Australia. Potential participants were directed to access the 176	
participant information sheet (see Supplementary Materials, File S2) via the university website or to 177	
contact the study’s Project Officer for further information. The flyer and the participant information 178	
sheet stated that participants would receive 50 AUD (approximately 40 USD at the time of this study) 179	
to cover their time and travel expenses but that there was potential to receive higher amounts 180	
depending upon their driving behaviour in a simulated driving scenario. Individuals who contacted the 181	
Project Officer were sent a participant information sheet via email or directed to the participant 182	
information sheet online. Participants were assessed against inclusion/exclusion criteria based on 183	
information provided via online forms or over the phone.  184	
To meet the inclusion criteria, participants needed to be between 17 and 25 years old, hold a 185	
provisional Western Australian driving licence, understand explanatory statements, instructions and 186	
questionnaires written in English, and be able to participate in a driving simulator session of 187	
approximately 45 minutes duration. Potential participants with a previous diagnosis of epilepsy were 188	
excluded. Potential participants meeting the inclusion/exclusion criteria were invited to participate 189	
and consented over the phone or via email.  190	
2.3 Randomisation, allocation concealment & blinding 191	
After inclusion and consent, an appointment was set for each participant to attend the location of the 192	
driving simulator for the purposes of completing a participant survey and simulator session. The 193	
Project Officer then requested a randomisation ID and treatment allocation from a team member not 194	
located at the simulator site and not engaged in any other aspect of administering the experiment. 195	
Study participants were randomised to one of four experimental conditions (HP, HR, LP, LR) using a 196	
randomisation sequence generated by a web randomisation service (www.randomization.com), with 197	
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recruitment and randomisation continuing until the target sample size of 80 participants had been 198	
achieved. The team member allocating participants (DM) was blind to all participant characteristics at 199	
the point of randomisation. Participants were blind to the set of possible treatments and to the levels 200	
of their assigned treatment (high, low; penalty, reward) but it was neither possible (nor desirable) to 201	
blind participants to the structure of the financial incentives they faced during the experiment.  202	
2.4  Delivery and data collection  203	
At the start of each appointment, participants were asked to complete a survey (see Supplementary 204	
Materials, File S3) that included questions about their age, gender, employment status, education, 205	
income, driving experience, and attitudes to driving (adapted from Iversen, 2004). After completing 206	
the survey, participants were asked to practise driving in the simulator for 5 minutes. The driving 207	
simulator replicates the experience of driving on the road but carries a risk of simulator sickness 208	
(Brooks et al, 2010). Participants experiencing symptoms of simulator sickness – as assessed using a 209	
standard screening tool after the practice session (Kennedy et al, 1993) or based on self-report at any 210	
other stage during the experiment – were excluded from further participation.  211	
After completing the practice session, participants completed a baseline run using the scenario 212	
developed for the study (~12.5km drive distance). Each participant’s driving behaviour in the baseline 213	
run was used in our analysis to adjust for between-group differences in participants’ propensity for 214	
risky driving that may have remained despite randomisation. Participants were randomly assigned to 215	
complete the baseline run of the scenario in one direction (Scenario A) and to complete the 216	
experimental run in the reverse direction (Scenario B); so that the experimental run was not simply a 217	
re-run of the baseline run. The intent was to reduce practice effects (whereby driving behaviour 218	
improved or deteriorated between baseline and experimental runs simply due to familiarity rather than 219	
exposure to the experimental treatment) and to avoid order effects (whereby driving behaviour 220	
improved or deteriorated between baseline and experimental runs simply due to the higher/lower 221	
difficulty of the experimental run).  222	
After completing their baseline run, the Project Officer read participants a script and provided them 223	
with a printed hand-out describing the financial incentive for the participant’s assigned treatment 224	
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group. Prior to this point, participants were only aware of the potential to receive additional money for 225	
safe-driving behaviour in a simulated driving scenario and were blind to the specifics of the incentives 226	
that they would face in the experimental run. Table 1 reproduces text from the printed hand-out for 227	
the HP, HR, LP, and LR conditions. To replicate the impact of time pressure on real-world driving 228	
behaviour (see Fitzpatrick et al, 2017), all participants faced a time-limit for completing the 229	
experimental run and were informed that rewards (in the case of HR & LR conditions) or any 230	
remaining balance from the participant’s safe-driving account (in the case of HP & LP conditions) 231	
would only be paid if the scenario for their experimental run was completed within the time-limit. 232	
Unlike participants driving under ‘hurried’ and ‘very hurried’ conditions in previous studies 233	
(Fitzpatrick et al, 2017), participants in the present study did not receive pop-up notifications 234	
comparing time elapsed against drive progress. The time-pressure on participants in the present study 235	
can therefore be characterised as relatively weak.  236	
The dollar-values of high-value (up to 15 AUD) and low-value incentives (up to 5 AUD) described in 237	
Table 1 are broadly consistent with the dollar-value of low- and high-value incentives in previous 238	
simulator studies. For example, Hultkrantz and Lindberg (2011) specified a ‘low’ penalty of up to 1 239	
Swedish Kroner (SEK) per minute of speeding (up to 20 SEK or around 3.10 AUD per 20 minute 240	
simulator run) and a ‘high’ penalty of up to 2 SEK per minute of speeding (up to 40 SEK or around 241	
6.20 AUD per 20 minute simulator run). Dijksterhuis et al (2015) offered a low-value PAYD 242	
incentive “with small rates of gain” (p103) capped at €3 per simulator run (~4.70 AUD per simulator 243	
run). Mullen et al (2015) constructed a token economy in which participants could earn up to 10 USD 244	
in vouchers per simulator run (~12.90 AUD per simulator run) but made no statement to indicate 245	
whether they considered this ‘high’ or ‘low’.  246	
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Table	1:	Description	of	financial	incentives	for	each	treatment	group	247	
	 High-value	 Low-value	
Re
w
ar
d	
Rewards	for	safe	driving	behaviours	
You	can	earn	an	extra	$15	if	you	drive	safely	in	
the	next	simulator	session.	This	session	will	last	
for	15	minutes	and	will	simulate	risky	driving	
situations	that	drivers	commonly	face	on	
Australian	roads.	In	order	to	earn	the	extra	$15,	
you	will	need	to	keep	to	speed	limits,	obey	traffic	
signals	and	give-way	rules,	and	keep	a	safe	
distance	between	you	and	other	road	users.	You’ll	
also	need	to	complete	the	entire	course	within	the	
allocated	time.			
Rewards	for	safe	driving	behaviours	
You	can	earn	an	extra	$5	if	you	drive	safely	in	the	
next	simulator	session.	This	session	will	last	for	15	
minutes	and	will	simulate	risky	driving	situations	
that	drivers	commonly	face	on	Australian	roads.	
In	order	to	earn	the	extra	$5,	you	will	need	to	
keep	to	speed	limits,	obey	traffic	signals	and	give-
way	rules,	and	keep	a	safe	distance	between	you	
and	other	road	users.	You’ll	also	need	to	complete	
the	entire	course	within	the	allocated	time.				
Pe
na
lty
	
Penalties	for	risky	driving	behaviours	
An	extra	$15	has	been	deposited	into	your	‘safe-
driving	account’.	This	is	separate	from	the	$50	
payment	you	will	receive	for	participating	today.	
You	can	keep	this	$15	if	you	drive	safely	in	the	
next	simulator	session	but	the	amount	you	can	
keep	will	get	smaller	every	time	you	drive	in	a	
way	that	poses	a	risk	to	yourself	or	other	road-
users.	This	session	will	last	for	15	minutes	and	will	
simulate	risky	driving	situations	that	drivers	
commonly	face	on	Australian	roads.	Penalties	will	
be	applied	whenever	you	exceed	speed	limits,	
disobey	traffic	signals	or	give-way	rules,	or	fail	to	
keep	a	safe	distance	between	you	and	other	road	
users.	You’ll	also	need	to	complete	the	entire	
course	within	the	allocated	time.	If	you	receive	
too	many	penalties	or	don’t	complete	the	course,	
the	balance	in	your	‘safe-driving	account’	will	fall	
to	zero	and	there	will	be	nothing	left	to	withdraw	
at	the	end	of	your	session.						
Penalties	for	risky	driving	behaviours	
An	extra	$5	has	been	deposited	into	your	‘safe-
driving	account’.	This	is	separate	from	the	$50	
payment	you	will	receive	for	participating	today.	
You	can	keep	this	$5	if	you	drive	safely	in	the	next	
simulator	session	but	the	amount	you	can	keep	
will	get	smaller	every	time	you	drive	in	a	way	that	
poses	a	risk	to	yourself	or	other	road-users.	This	
session	will	last	for	15	minutes	and	will	simulate	
risky	driving	situations	that	drivers	commonly	
face	on	Australian	roads.	Penalties	will	be	applied	
whenever	you	exceed	speed	limits,	disobey	traffic	
signals	or	give-way	rules,	or	fail	to	keep	a	safe	
distance	between	you	and	other	road	users.	You’ll	
also	need	to	complete	the	entire	course	within	the	
allocated	time.		If	you	receive	too	many	penalties	
or	don’t	complete	the	course,	the	balance	in	your	
‘safe-driving	account’	will	fall	to	zero	and	there	
will	be	nothing	left	to	withdraw	at	the	end	of	your	
session.				
 248	
After confirming that the participant had read and understood the instructions, the participant 249	
commenced the experimental run. During the experimental run, the driving simulator continuously 250	
tracked speed and road position as participants encountered a range of roadway situations. Simulator 251	
data were used to identify risky driving behaviours (such as exceeding the posted speed limit, hard 252	
braking and excessive swerving) and to calculate measures of the frequency and severity of these 253	
behaviours (defined below). At the conclusion of the experimental session, all participants (regardless 254	
of treatment group) were paid the high-value incentive in the full amount (regardless of driving 255	
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behaviour) plus the participation incentive. The intent was to simplify the administration of payments 256	
(which would otherwise have required extraction and analysis of data from the experimental run) and 257	
to avoid potential delays between scheduled appointments. Ethical approval for this study was 258	
obtained from the University of Melbourne Human Research Ethics Committee (approval number 259	
1646290.1); local ethics and research governance procedures were subsequently completed at the 260	
study site (Curtin University Approval Number RDHS-113-16). 261	
2.5 Facilities 262	
The advanced driving simulator laboratory at Curtin University in Perth, Australia, offered a safe and 263	
controlled environment in which to examine the effect of incentives on risky driving behaviours. The 264	
simulator used for the experiment is a state-of-the-art CKAS Mechatronics driving simulator. The 265	
simulator incorporates a complete Holden Commodore (a four-door family sedan with a significant 266	
share of the Australian market), allowing participants to drive using the same controls, instruments 267	
and driving systems, and in the same seat and cabin, they would use in a Holden Commodore on the 268	
road. The full motion system recreates forces, loads and sounds consistent with the participant’s 269	
driving behaviour, replicating the feel of real-world driving. Participants have a full 360° view of the 270	
road and surroundings via a ‘windscreen’, ‘side windows’ and mirrors. When combined with a 271	
driving scenario that replicates street signage, street furniture, road-side surroundings, and traffic 272	
conditions of local roads, simulator runs can provide a close analogue to on-road driving.  273	
The simulated driving scenario used in this experiment was designed specifically for this study to 274	
replicate the experience of driving on local roads under local conditions. A schematic of the simulated 275	
driving scenario including the location of intersections, speed limit advisory signs, traffic lights, 276	
pedestrians, slow-moving vehicles and other hazards has been provided in Supplementary Materials 277	
(Supplementary Materials, File S4, Figure S4.1).  Stills / screenshots from video of a windscreen view 278	
and an above-following view from a drive-through of the simulated driving scenario have also been 279	
provided in Supplementary Materials (Supplementary Materials, File S4, Figures S4.2-7). 280	
Empirical evidence demonstrates close correspondence between simulator and on-road environments 281	
for changes in driving behaviour due to changes in driving conditions (relative validity) (Godley et al, 282	
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2002; Mullen et al, 2015; Yan et al, 2008) but not for the level of risky driving behaviours (absolute 283	
validity) (Godley et al, 2002). This offers some reassurance that the changes in driving behaviour we 284	
observe in the simulator, will provide a good indication of the relative magnitude of changes we can 285	
expect in on-road driving behaviour. 286	
2.6 Outcome measures 287	
Data obtained from the baseline and experimental simulator runs were used to identify risky driving 288	
behaviours (exceeding the posted speed limit, hard braking and excessive swerving) and to calculate 289	
measures of the frequency and severity of these behaviours. The primary outcome for evaluating the 290	
effect of financial incentives on risky driving behaviour was total seconds exceeding the posted speed 291	
limit of 80km/h. Secondary outcomes included (i) measures of speeding at higher thresholds, namely, 292	
total seconds exceeding the posted speed limit by ≥3km/h and by ≥6km/h, (ii) measures of hard 293	
braking, namely, total seconds over two braking thresholds defined as a decelerations of at least −0.4g 294	
and −0.5g measured in units of g-force, and (iii) measures of swerving, namely, total seconds over 295	
two swerving thresholds defined as movements in the y-dimension of at least 0.05g and 0.10g 296	
measured in units of g-force.  297	
Previous studies have defined qualitative labels for swerving, braking and acceleration events wherein 298	
a ‘red event’ is characterised as a “very aggressive driving manoeuvre that could result in injury or 299	
cause vehicle passengers or cargo that are not securely restrained to be shifted within the vehicle” and 300	
a ‘yellow event’ as “involving sufficient forces to cause passenger discomfort” (US Department of 301	
Transportation, 2014 p9). The US Department of Transportation estimated the threshold between a 302	
yellow event and a red event at around 10–15 ft/s2, equivalent to ±0.31–0.46g, which is consistent 303	
with the values selected for our two braking thresholds (US Department of Transportation, 2014). 304	
Qualitative labels defined by the US Department of Transportation suggest that the lower thresholds 305	
adopted for swerving in the present study are more indicative of frequent lane changing than ‘red’ or 306	
‘yellow’ evasive manoeuvres.   307	
For all primary and secondary outcomes, the corresponding measure can take a wide range of possible 308	
values; varying from zero seconds (threshold never exceeded during the 15 minute scenario) through 309	
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to 900 seconds (threshold exceeded for every second of the 15 minute scenario).	To test different 310	
hypotheses, we modelled participation or level as appropriate. Recall that participation refers to 311	
whether we observe a non-zero level of the relevant behaviour (as distinct to non-participation, a zero 312	
level of the relevant behaviour). For participation, we dichotomised the outcome measures (some 313	
versus none) to emphasise changes between zero levels of the relevant behaviour and some positive 314	
level of the relevant behaviour. When modelling levels, we treated the outcome measure as a 315	
continuous indicator of the relevant behaviour. While participation and level emphasise different 316	
shifts in behaviour, both are drawn from the same underlying data and so should not be interpreted as 317	
independent tests of the same hypothesis.   318	
2.7 Analysis 319	
Estimation of treatment effects relied on between-group comparisons of risky driving behaviours 320	
during the experimental run but exploited the panel structure of the data to control for any between-321	
group differences in participant characteristics. The simplest implementation of this empirical strategy 322	
would be to estimate Equation (1) below:   323	
 log(Yit) = αi + β1LPit + β2HPit + β3LRit + β4HRit + εit (1) 324	
Where Yit captures the primary or secondary outcome for participant i in period t over two time-325	
periods: pre (baseline run) and post (experimental run). A set of treatment variables identifies the 326	
incentive structure under which participants completed their experimental run: LPit (low penalty), HPit 327	
(high penalty), LRit (low reward), and HRit (high reward).1 Participant fixed effects (αi) control for 328	
any between-group differences in time-invariant participant characteristics.  329	
In this equation, coefficients on the treatment variables give the average main effects of assignment to 330	
treatment group relative to baseline. Contrasts between treatments can then be obtained from 331	
comparisons of coefficients to quantify the relative effectiveness of different treatments. Equation (1) 332	
																																								 																				
1	The treatment variables are dummy variables identifying whether or not a participant had been 
exposed to a high-value incentive at time t. For example, HPit=1 for participants completing their 
experimental run under the high-value penalty; HPit=0 for all participants during the baseline run and 
for participants completing their experimental run under the low-value reward (LR), high-value 
reward (HR) or low-value penalty (LP).   
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allows us to test for gain / loss asymmetry. If a high-value penalty is more effective than a high-value 333	
reward, we would expect |2 - 4| to be significantly greater than zero. If a low-value penalty is 334	
more effective than a low-value reward, we would expect |1 - 3| to be significantly greater than 335	
zero.  336	
Equation (1) also allows us to evaluate the net effect of incentives on the level of the relevant 337	
behaviour. If financial incentives have the net effect of decreasing the level of risky behaviours, then 338	
coefficients on all four treatment variables: β1, β2, β3, and β4, should be negative and significant. If a 339	
high-value penalty is more effective than and a low-value penalty, we would expect |β2 – β1| to be 340	
significantly greater than zero. If a high-reward penalty is more effective than a low-value reward, we 341	
would expect |β4 - β3| to be significantly greater than zero.  342	
For the present study, participation in risky driving behaviours was of independent interest as a test 343	
for motivational crowding out (whether incentives had the perverse effect of increasing the proportion 344	
of the study sample with non-zero levels of the relevant behaviour). To achieve this aim, we estimate 345	
the following equation:  346	
 347	
 Dit = γi + δ1LPit + δ2HPit + δ3LRit + δ4HRit + ωit   348	
(2) 349	
              where Dit=
1 if !!" > 0;0 if !!" = 0.  350	
  351	
Dit is a dummy indicator for participation (some versus none) in the relevant behaviour for participant 352	
i in period t over two time-periods: pre (baseline run) and post (experimental run). Estimating the 353	
participation equation via logit or probit results in loss of more than half of our sample because the 354	
participant fixed effect predicts failure / success perfectly for participants with no pre-post change in 355	
participation. For this reason, we estimate our participation equation using a linear probability model 356	
(LPM) but re-estimate using more familiar logit models in sensitivity analyses.   357	
For the participation equation (Equation 2), the main parameters of interest are the coefficients on the 358	
treatment variables: δ1, δ2, δ3, and δ4. If financial incentives have the effect of increasing participation 359	
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in risky behaviours (consistent with motivational crowding out), then coefficients on all four 360	
treatment variables should be positive and significant. If low-value rewards increase participation 361	
more than high-value rewards (consistent with motivational crowding out), then δ3 - δ4 should be 362	
positive and significantly greater than zero.  363	
3. RESULTS 364	
3.1  Recruitment & Study Sample 365	
Recruitment commenced in September 2016 and we randomised the final participant (n=99) in mid-366	
December 2016. After randomisation but prior to receipt of the assigned treatment, a number of 367	
participants were excluded from the study sample due to failure to attend (n=11). For participants who 368	
failed to attend their initial appointment, every attempt was made to schedule another appointment. 369	
Participants who failed to attend initial and subsequent appointments (n=11) were distributed equally 370	
across the four treatment groups (χ2=1.72, p=.63).  371	
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Similarly, a small number of participants (n=8) were excluded prior to treatment due to simulator 374	
sickness, with no significant differences in discontinuations between groups (χ2=1.26, p=.74). 375	
Recruitment and randomisation continued until we achieved our target sample size (n=80), after 376	
replacement of no-shows and exclusions prior to treatment. Figure 1 documents the flow of 377	
participants through the experiment; including the number discontinued from each treatment group at 378	
each stage of the experiment.       379	
Of the 80 participants who received their assigned treatment and commenced the experimental run, 380	
two participants were lost to follow-up due to failure to complete the experimental run. For one 381	
participant in the LP group, the practice scenario (different road map, no traffic, and shorter duration) 382	
was loaded instead of the scenario completed by all other participants in the experimental run. In the 383	
LR group, one participant commenced the experimental run but pulled over and stopped driving prior 384	
to completing the scenario. This participant reported symptoms of simulator sickness and was 385	
excluded as per our inclusion / exclusion criteria. As recruitment had been finalised, we were unable 386	
to replace this participant.  387	
Table 2 summarises participant characteristics for our final study sample (n=78). Participants ranged 388	
in age from 17 to 24 years, were more likely to be male (60%), and more likely to have been born in 389	
Australia (69%). Participants were novice drivers with an average of 12.5 weeks of driving experience 390	
and an average of 6.5 hours of driving experience per week since receiving their Probationary Licence. 391	
Despite their lack of experience, participant responses on the attitudes to risky driving (ATRD) scale 392	
suggested low levels of endorsement of risky driving behaviours (mean: 28.6, range: 17-46). 393	
Participants were drawn from postcode areas with relatively low levels of socio-economic 394	
disadvantage, populated by households and individuals with relatively high levels of education and 395	
working in high-skill occupations. 396	
	 	397	
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Table	2:	Characteristics	of	the	Study	Sample	398	
Participant	characteristics	
LP	(N=19)	 LR	(N=19)	 HP	(N=19)	 HR	(N=21)	 All	(N=78)	
n/N	(%)	or	Mean	(Min-Max)	
Age	(years)	 18.3	(17-21)	 18.3	(17-23)	 18.4	(17-24)	 17.8	(17-20)	 18.2	(17-24)	
Gender	(%	Male)	 10	/	19	(53%)	 8	/	19	(42%)	 12	/	19	(63%)	 16	/	20	(80%)	 46	/	77	(60%)	
Born	in	Australia	 14	/	19	(74%)	 15	/	18	(83%)	 14	/	19	(74%)	 10	/	21	(48%)	 53	/	77	(69%)	
Weeks	since	probationary	
licence	(P-plates)?		
12.6	(1-26)	 10.0	(0-21)	 14.5	(2-27)	 13.8	(1-25)	 12.5	(0-27)	
Ave	hrs	per	wk	of	driving	
since	awarded	P-plates?	
7.7	(2-15)	 5.9	(1-18)	 7.8	(2-21)	 5.4	(1-14)	 6.7	(1-21)	
SEIFA	Index	by	postcode,	
decile	rank	in	Australia		
	 	 	 	 	
Socio-economic	Disadv	#	 8.0	(4-10)	 8.2	(5-10)	 9.2	(6-10)	 8.7	(6-10)	 8.5	(4-10)	
Education	&	Occupation^		 7.5	(3-10)	 8.1	(3-10)	 8.6	(6-10)	 8.4	(4-10)	 8.2	(3-10)	
Attitudes	to	risky	driving	~	 27.9	(18-45)	 28.5	(17-46)	 29.5	(20-39)	 28.7	(20-42)	 28.6	(17-46)	
#The	SEIFA	Index	of	Education	&	Occupation	(ABS,	2011)	describes	the	education	and	occupation	of	individuals	and	399	
households	resident	in	a	postcode	area.	Higher	index	scores	indicate	areas	with	many	individuals	with	higher	qualifications,	400	
employed	in	high-skill	occupations.	The	top	(bottom)	decile	is	comprised	of	areas	with	the	highest	(lowest)	index	scores.		401	
^The	SEIFA	Index	of	Socio-economic	Disadvantage	(ABS,	2011)	describes	the	economic	and	social	disadvantage	of	402	
individuals	and	households	resident	in	a	postcode	area.	Higher	index	scores	indicate	areas	with	a	relative	lack	of	403	
disadvantage.	The	top	(bottom)	decile	would	be	comprised	of	areas	with	the	lowest	(highest)	level	of	disadvantage.		404	
~Attitudes	to	risky	driving	(ATRD)	were	evaluated	on	a	five-point	Likert	scale	over	16	items	and	three	main	factors	405	
capturing	attitudes	toward	rule	violations	and	speeding,	attitudes	toward	careless	driving	of	others,	and	attitudes	toward	406	
drink-driving	(Iversen,	2004).	In	our	sample,	the	16	ATRD	items	had	a	Cronbach’s	alpha	of	0.8169;	suggesting	that	these	407	
items	combine	to	provide	an	internally	consistent	measure	of	the	same	underlying	construct.	Summary	scores	were	408	
calculated	as	the	sum	of	all	item-scores,	after	(re)coding	all	response	data	so	that	higher	item-scores	indicated	409	
endorsement	of	higher-risk	behaviours.	ATRD	summary	scores	had	a	possible	range	of	16	to	80,	with	higher	scores	410	
indicating	more	frequent	endorsement	of	higher-risk	behaviours.			411	
 412	
Table 2 also compares participant characteristics across the four treatment groups. At a significance 413	
level of 0.05, the four groups were not significantly different with respect to any participant 414	
characteristic. The largest between-group differences were for gender (χ2=6.36, p=.10) and country of 415	
birth (χ2=5.61, p=.13). This is addressed by using participant fixed effects in our empirical models to 416	
control for between-group differences in observed and unobserved participant characteristics. 	417	
3.2 Motivational Crowding Out 418	
Pre-post comparisons suggest that incentives have no statistically significant impact on participation 419	
in speeding (χ2=0.24, p=.63). Table 3 summarises the pre-post changes in participation by treatment 420	
group. Here, the pre-post change in participation reflects the net effect of movement by some 421	
participants from zero levels at baseline to positive levels in the experimental run and movement by a 422	
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second group of participants from positive levels at baseline to zero levels in the experimental run. 423	
For speeding, 16 / 78 (21%) participants had zero levels at baseline but positive levels in the 424	
experimental run but this increase in participation was offset by the 19 / 78 (24%) participants with 425	
positive levels at baseline but zero levels in the experimental run. 426	
Table	3:	Participation	and	levels	of	risky	driving	behaviours	427	
Outcome	measure	 Participation:	n%			 Levels:	Mean(SD)	seconds,	Min-Max	
Period	 LP	 HP	 LR	 HR	 All	 LP	 HP	 LR	 HR	 All	
Speeding+		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Pre		 63	 74	 37	 57	 58	 25(38),	0-103	 30(40),	0-118	 22(58),	0-226	 23(33),	0-105	 25(42),	0-226	
Post	 53	 63	 42	 57	 54	 10(19),	0-79	 9(14),	0-42	 18(44),	0-168	 7(14),	0-48	 11(26),	0-168	
Speeding+3km/h	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Pre		 32	 47	 21	 43	 36	 15(27),	0-86	 19(34),	0-112	 18(48),	0-185	 7(23),	0-155	 14(33),	0-185	
Post	 32	 37	 26	 19	 28	 6(16),	0-68	 5(10),	0-38	 14(41),	0-155	 3(9),	0-42	 7(23),	0-155	
Speeding+6km/h	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Pre		 26	 32	 16	 14	 22	 11(21),	0-76	 15(30),	0-102	 15(41),	0-165	 3(12),	0-56	 11(28),	0-165	
Post	 16	 21	 11	 10	 14	 4(13),	0-53	 3(9),	0-34	 12(37),	0-141	 2(7),	0-33	 5(20),	0-141	
Braking−0.4g	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Pre		 100	 95	 100	 100	 99	 7(6),	1-25	 6(5),	0-20	 5(5),	>0-19	 5(3),	1-12	 6(5),	0-25	
Post	 100	 95	 95	 96	 96	 6(5),	2-20	 5(4),	0-19	 5(5),	0-20	 4(3),	1-13	 5(4),	0-20	
Braking−0.5g	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Pre		 89	 89	 84	 81	 86	 4(4),	0-19	 3(2),	0-9	 2(3),	0-14	 2(2),	0-7	 3(3),	0-19	
Post	 100	 89	 79	 67	 83	 3(3),	>0-14	 2(2),	0-10	 2(4),	0-15	 1(2),	0-7	 2(3),	0-15	
Swerving±0.05g	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Pre		 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 17(16),	1-72	 17(11),	2-43	 11(10),	1-37	 14(9),	3-38	 15(12),	1-72	
Post	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 8(6),	>0-21		 10(6),	2-23	 10(9),	1-37	 10(7),	1-28	 9(7),	>0-37		
Swerving±0.10g	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Pre		 63	 68	 63	 71	 67	 4(11),	0-49	 3(5),	0-18	 1(2),	0-6	 2(2),	0-9	 3(6),	0-49	
Post	 68	 74	 74	 52	 67	 1(1),	0-3	 1(1),	0-4	 1(3),	0-14	 1(2),	0-8	 1(2),	0-14	
 428	
Table 4 reports estimated treatment effects from the regression models for (net) participation in the 429	
primary outcome relative to baseline, after controlling for participant fixed effects. Results for the full 430	
sample from the main LPM confirm that treatment effects with respect to participation are not 431	
significantly different from zero for any of the four treatments; with no evidence of a trend towards 432	
increased participation in speeding due to motivational crowding out. Results from more familiar 433	
logit models exclude data for a large number of participants with no pre-post change in participation 434	
(because the participant fixed effect predicts failure / success perfectly). Results from these models 435	
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(not reported but available upon request) were qualitatively consistent with results for the main model 436	
and from a LPM estimated in the same sub-sample used for estimation of logit models. For 437	
participation in speeding, differences between coefficients on low-value and high-value rewards were 438	
not significant in any model (p≥.68). 439	
Table	4:	Effect	of	financial	incentives	on	the	primary	outcome	440	
	
Participation:	
D(Speeding+)		
Level:	Speeding+	
LPM,	FEa	
(1)	
OLS,	FE:	Log(Yit)
a	
(2)	
OLS,	FE:	Yit	
(3)	
Low	Penalty	(LP)	 -0.105	 -0.919	 -15.71*	
	
(0.157)	 (0.729)	 (8.36)	
High	Penalty	(HP)	 -0.105	 -1.030	 -20.60**	
	
(0.157)	 (0.729)	 (8.36)	
Low	Reward	(LR)	 0.053	 0.285	 -4.73	
	
(0.157)	 (0.729)	 (8.36)	
High	Reward	(HR)	 0.000	 -0.988	 -15.58*	
	 (0.149)	 (0.693)	 (7.95)	
constant	 			0.577***	 					0.634**	 					25.09***	
	 (0.055)	 (0.254)	 (2.92)	
Observations	(N*T)	 156	 156	 156	
Participants	(N)	 78	 78	 78	
Beta	coefficients	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*	p	<	.10,	**	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.01	441	
a	Main	model.	Participant	fixed	effects	included	but	results	omitted	for	brevity.		442	
LPM:	Linear	Probability	Model.	FE:	fixed-effects	within	estimator.		443	
	444	
Table 4 also reports the effect of incentives on levels of the primary outcome (total seconds exceeding 445	
the posted speed limit of 80km/h) relative to baseline. Results from the regression of treatment 446	
variables on the untransformed speeding data (model 3) suggest that LP, HP, and HR provoked 447	
potentially important reductions in the level of speeding which reached significance at conventional 448	
levels for the HP condition (p=.02) and approached significance for LP (p=.06) and HR (p=.054) 449	
conditions. For the main levels regression on log-transformed data (model 2), reductions were again 450	
observed for LP, HP and HR conditions but with a somewhat higher probability that these reductions 451	
were due to chance (p≥.16). To test if high-value incentives were more effective than low-value 452	
incentives in reducing levels of speeding, we contrasted coefficients on low-value and high-value 453	
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penalties and low-value and high-value rewards; differences between coefficients for low-value and 454	
high-value incentives were not significantly different in any model (p≥.21). 455	
Figure 2: Pre-post change in speed by distance travelled (per participant) 456	
 457	
Table 5 reports results for participation and levels models on secondary speeding outcomes: speeding 458	
in excess of 3km/h and 6km/h over the posted speed limit of 80km/h. While it is recognised that 459	
speeding at higher severity thresholds for even short durations of time may equate to substantial 460	
increments in risk, participation rates for speeding at higher severity thresholds were low even at 461	
baseline; leaving little room for response to treatment. Figure 2 graphs speed against distance 462	
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travelled, summarising minimum/maximum speed and duration of higher severity speeding for each 463	
participant, for the baseline (top panels) and experimental runs (bottom panels), and by order of 464	
completion (Scenario A then B, or Scenario B then A).  465	
Table	5:	Effect	of	financial	incentives	on	secondary	speeding	outcomes	466	
	
Participation:		
D(Speed+3km/h)		
Participation:		
D(Speed+6km/h)	
Level:		
Speed+3km/h	
Level:		
Speed+6km/h	
LPM,	FE	
(4)	
LPM,	FE	
(5)	
Log(Yit)	
(6)	
Yit	
(7)	
Log(Yit)	
(8)	
Yit	
(9)	
Low	Penalty	(LP)	 0.000	 -0.105	 -0.685	 -9.09	 -0.733	 -7.03	
	
(0.132)	 (0.105)	 (0.659)	 (6.73)	 (0.606)	 (5.74)	
High	Penalty	(HP)	 -0.105	 -0.105	 -1.050	 -14.26**	 -0.840	 -11.75**	
	
(0.132)	 (0.105)	 (0.659)	 (6.73)	 (0.606)	 (5.74)	
Low	Reward	(LR)	 0.053	 -0.053	 -0.032	 -4.01	 -0.319	 -3.01	
	
(0.157)	 (0.105)	 (0.659)	 (6.73)	 (0.606)	 (5.74)	
High	Reward	(HR)	 -0.238	 -0.048	 -0.886	 -4.08	 -0.190	 -1.30	
	 (0.126)	 (0.100)	 (0.627)	 (6.40)	 (0.577)	 (5.46)	
constant	 			0.359***	 				0.218***	 -0.478**	 14.44***	 -1.050***	 10.87***	
	 (0.046)	 (0.037)	 (0.230)	 (2.35)	 (0.211)	 (2.00)	
Observations	(N*T)	 156	 156	 156	 156	 156	 156	
Participants	(N)	 78	 78	 78	 78	 78	 78	
Beta	coefficients	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*	p	<	.10,	**	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.01	467	
Participant	fixed	effects	included	but	results	omitted	for	brevity.		LPM:	Linear	Probability	Model.		FE:	fixed-effects	468	
within	estimator.		469	
	470	
As with the primary outcome, pre-post comparisons suggest that incentives have no statistically 471	
significant impact on participation in speeding at either the 3km/h (χ2=1.06, p=.30) or 6km/h (χ2=1.57, 472	
p=.21) threshold but these are net effects that comprise movements in to and out of participation. For 473	
speeding in excess of 3km/h over the posted speed limit, 10 / 78 (13%) participants had zero levels at 474	
baseline but positive levels in the experimental run; 12 / 78 (15%) participants had positive levels at 475	
baseline but zero levels in the experimental run. For speeding in excess of 6km/h over the posted 476	
speed limit, 5 / 78 (6%) participants had zero levels at baseline but positive levels in the experimental 477	
run; 6 / 78 (8%) participants had positive levels at baseline but zero levels in the experimental run. 478	
Results from the main LPMs (models 4 & 5) confirm that none of the four treatments provoked a 479	
change in net participation; with no suggestion of any trend towards increased participation as we 480	
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would expect if financial incentives had the effect of crowding out a pervasive intrinsic motivation for 481	
safe driving.  482	
Results from the regression of treatment variables on the untransformed speeding data (models 7 & 9) 483	
again suggest that HP provoked a significant reduction in the level of speeding. For the higher severity 484	
thresholds, reductions in speeding in response to LP and LR conditions were no longer significant 485	
(p≥.18) but the direction and relative magnitudes of treatment effects remain broadly consistent with 486	
results for our primary outcome. Results from regressions on log-transformed speeding (models 6 & 8) 487	
follow a similar pattern, with HP provoking the largest magnitude reduction in speeding (p≥.12) 488	
followed by LP (p≥.23) or HR (p≥.16), depending upon the severity threshold, but with none of these 489	
effects achieving statistical significance at conventional levels.    490	
For secondary braking and swerving outcomes, baseline participation rates were too high to permit 491	
meaningful testing of hypotheses regarding motivational crowding out. For secondary braking 492	
outcomes at baseline, 77 participants (99%) had non-zero levels of braking at the -0.4g threshold and 493	
67 participants (86%) had non-zero levels of braking at the -0.5g threshold. For secondary swerving 494	
outcomes at baseline, 78 participants (100%) had non-zero levels of swerving at the 0.05g threshold 495	
and 52 participants (67%) had non-zero levels of swerving at the 0.10g threshold, with no pre-post 496	
difference in participation for either threshold. 497	
3.3 Gain/Loss Asymmetry  498	
Table 4 reports the effect of incentives on levels of the primary outcome (total seconds exceeding the 499	
posted speed limit of 80km/h) relative to baseline. As reported above, potentially important reductions 500	
in speeding were observed for LP, HP and HR conditions; with these reductions reaching or 501	
approaching significance in some models. To test if penalties were more effective than otherwise 502	
equivalent rewards in reducing levels of speeding (gain / loss asymmetry), we contrasted coefficients 503	
on low-value penalties and low-value rewards and on high-value penalties and high-value rewards. 504	
Relativities between coefficients were broadly consistent across models; with the high-penalty 505	
provoking a larger reduction in speeding than the high-reward and the low-penalty provoking a larger 506	
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reduction than the low-reward. For the primary outcome, these differences were not statistically 507	
significant in any model (p≥.25).  508	
Table 5 reports the effect of incentives on levels of the secondary speeding outcomes: speeding in 509	
excess of 3km/h over the posted speed limit and speeding in excess of 6km/h over the posted speed 510	
limit. For the secondary speeding outcomes, penalties again provoked larger reductions in speeding 511	
than an equal value reward but differences failed to reach significance at conventional levels (p≥.19).    512	
Table	6:	Effect	of	financial	incentives	on	secondary	braking	and	swerving	outcomes	513	
	
Level:		
Braking−0.4g	
Level:		
Braking−0.5g	
Level:		
Swerving±0.05g	
Level:		
Swerving±0.10g	
Log(Yit)	
(10)	
Yit	
(11)	
Log(Yit)	
(12)	
Yit	
(13)	
Log(Yit)	
(14)	
Yit	
(15)	
Log(Yit)	
(16)	
Yit	
(17)	
Low	Penalty	(LP)	 -0.123	 -1.137	 -0.379	 -0.987**	 -0.737***	 -8.661***	 -0.434*	 -3.342**	
	
(0.207)	 (0.742)	 (0.270)	 (0.458)	 (0.174)	 (2.392)	 (0.233)	 (1.396)	
High	Penalty	(HP)	 -0.337	 -1.416*	 -0.250	 -0.455	 -0.516***	 -6.984***	 -0.724***	 -2.305*	
	
(0.207)	 (0.742)	 (0.270)	 (0.458)	 (0.174)	 (2.392)	 (0.233)	 (1.396)	
Low	Reward	(LR)	 0.029	 -0.334	 -0.196	 -0.347	 -0.095	 -1.442	 -0.256	 0.061	
	
(0.207)	 (0.742)	 (0.270)	 (0.458)	 (0.174)	 (2.392)	 (0.233)	 (1.396)	
High	Reward	(HR)	 -0.042	 -0.421	 -0.491*	 -1.029**	 -0.410**	 -3.969*	 -0.354	 -0.724	
	 (0.197)	 (0.706)	 (0.257)	 (0.435)	 (0.166)	 (2.275)	 (0.222)	 (1.328)	
constant	 1.408***	 5.709***	 0.628***	 2.733***	 2.367***	 14.654***	 0.565***	 2.737***	
	 (0.072)	 (0.259)	 (0.094)	 (0.160)	 (0.061)	 (0.835)	 (0.081)	 (0.487)	
Observations	(N*T)	 156	 156	 156	 156	 156	 156	 156	 156	
Participants	(N)	 78	 78	 78	 78	 78	 78	 78	 78	
Beta	coefficients	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*	p	<	.10,	**	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.01	514	
Participant	fixed	effects	included	but	results	omitted	for	brevity.		515	
	516	
Table 6 reports the effect of incentives on levels of braking and swerving. For braking, absolute levels 517	
at baseline were very low (Braking −0.4g: mean=5.71 seconds, sd=4.61; Braking −0.5g: mean=2.73 518	
seconds, sd=3.07) despite the very high levels of participation reported above. That is to say, most 519	
participants had non-zero levels of braking at the relevant threshold but typically only for a handful of 520	
seconds each. Pre-post reductions were smaller still and of no practical significance despite reaching 521	
or approaching statistical significance for some thresholds in some models (see results for models 11, 522	
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12 and 13 in Table 6). Results for the braking models are therefore reported only for completeness 523	
and we make no attempt to interpret results.       524	
For swerving outcomes, LP and HP provoked significant reductions at the lower severity threshold 525	
(Swerving±0.05g). Reductions in swerving were also observed for LP and HP at the higher severity 526	
threshold (Swerving±0.10g) and for the HR condition at the lower severity threshold 527	
(Swerving±0.05g) but treatment effects were smaller in magnitude and failed to reach statistical 528	
significance at the .05 level in some models. LR had an approximately zero impact on swerving in all 529	
models and at both thresholds.  530	
To test if penalties were significantly more effective than rewards in reducing levels of swerving, we 531	
again contrasted coefficients on low-value penalties and low-value rewards and high-value penalties 532	
and high-value rewards. At the lower severity threshold (Swerving±0.05g), LP was significantly more 533	
effective than LR for model 14 (F=6.78, p=.01) and model 15 (F=4.55, p=.04). At the higher severity 534	
threshold (Swerving±0.10g), the larger reduction in response to LP approached significance for 535	
untransformed swerving data (model 17: F=2.97, p=.09) but not for log-transformed data (model 16: 536	
F=0.29, p=.59). Despite achieving consistently larger reductions in swerving under the HP condition 537	
than under the HR condition, differences between HP and HR coefficients were small in magnitude 538	
and failed to reach significance for all models and at both thresholds (p≥.25). 539	
4. DISCUSSION 540	
Results suggest that incentives can influence driving behaviour in simulated driving scenarios. The 541	
high-value penalty provoked potentially important reductions in speeding and swerving across a range 542	
of different severity thresholds and model specifications, though these reductions fell short of 543	
statistical significance in some models. Moreover, results suggest that ‘smart’ but lower-cost financial 544	
incentives have the potential to reduce risky driving behaviour. Our low-value penalties provoked 545	
statistically significant reductions in swerving and reductions in speeding outcomes (including the 546	
primary outcome) that were similar in magnitude to those observed for high-value incentives.     547	
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With respect to motivational crowding out, we hypothesised that financial incentives would increase 548	
participation in risky behaviours and that this increase would be larger for low-value incentives than 549	
for high-value incentives. Results were inconsistent with both of these hypotheses suggesting that, at 550	
least for novice drivers in a simulated driving scenario, motivational crowding out is unlikely to 551	
negate the positive effects of low-value incentives on safe driving.  552	
With respect to gain/loss asymmetry, penalties provoked larger reductions in speeding than equal 553	
value rewards but there remained a relatively high probability that this difference was due to chance 554	
(p≥.19). We found stronger evidence for gain / loss asymmetry for swerving where low-value 555	
penalties were more effective than low-value rewards, though this difference between penalties and 556	
rewards was no longer statistically significant for high-severity swerving in log-transformed models. 557	
These results suggest that gain / loss asymmetry may usefully inform the design of incentive 558	
structures that do more with less (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); making payments (or penalties) for 559	
safe driving more economically feasible for insurance companies or government agencies (Bolderdijk 560	
& Steg, 2011).  561	
The present study offers a number of lessons for researchers and policy makers seeking to build an 562	
evidence-base to inform the design of smarter financial incentives. First, the present study evaluated 563	
the impact of incentives with respect to several risky driving behaviours. While the level of speeding 564	
and swerving varied between individuals and between baseline and experimental simulator runs 565	
(suggesting sensitivity to differences in driving behaviour), braking outcomes were subject to floor 566	
effects that limited their usefulness for evaluating treatment effects. Put simply, the very low levels of 567	
braking observed during the baseline run left little room for response to treatment and little 568	
opportunity to test our hypotheses regarding motivational crowding out and gain/loss asymmetry. For 569	
participation, both braking and swerving were subject to ceiling effects; with a very high proportion 570	
of participants braking or swerving over the relevant threshold (but for just a handful of seconds in 571	
each run). This meant that we were unable to test for the presence / absence of motivational crowding 572	
out using either braking or swerving data.  573	
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For swerving, ceiling effects in participation data may partly reflect severity thresholds that are more 574	
indicative of lane changing than of ‘red’ or ‘yellow’ evasive manoeuvres. In such circumstances, 575	
higher levels of swerving would reflect frequent lane changing and interpretation of levels of swerving 576	
as a measure of risky driving remains appropriate (Dula & Geller, 2003). For braking, floor and 577	
ceiling effects were unlikely to have been introduced as a consequence of our choice of severity 578	
thresholds or instrumentation / measurement of forces in the simulator environment. The thresholds 579	
against which our braking outcomes were defined are consistent with the US Department of 580	
Transportation threshold for a red event at our upper severity threshold and equate to a mid-way point 581	
between a yellow and red event for our low severity threshold (US Department of Transportation, 582	
2014). The very high rate of participation in hard braking within our study sample is surprising given 583	
that a yellow event would “involv(e) sufficient forces to cause passenger discomfort” and a red event 584	
“could result in injury or cause vehicle passengers or cargo that are not securely restrained to be 585	
shifted within the vehicle” (US Department of Transportation, 2014 p9). It may be that our sample of 586	
novice drivers and an unfamiliar simulator environment combined to increase the probability of 587	
braking miscalculations but that the potential for multiple red or yellow events within a short and 588	
relatively ‘simple’ simulator run, remained low. Future studies may wish to provide novice drivers 589	
with the opportunity for practice runs of a longer duration than the 5 minutes afforded to participants 590	
in the present study and / or employ more ‘difficult’ or ‘complex’ driving scenarios for baseline and 591	
experimental runs.  592	
Second, while details of the assigned treatment were withheld from participants until just before the 593	
experimental run and after completion of the baseline run; the initial call for participants and 594	
participant information sheet made it clear that the study offered an opportunity to receive additional 595	
money for safe-driving behaviour. For this reason, all groups may have driven more safely than usual 596	
in the baseline and experimental runs and the estimated treatment effects may therefore be an 597	
underestimate of the behavioural response to incentives. Along similar lines, estimated treatment 598	
effects may also be underestimated simply because the “knowledge of being monitored can alter 599	
driving behaviour” (Bolderdijk & Steg, 2011). Previous studies have demonstrated the potential 600	
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significance of Hawthorne effects (see Dixit et al, 2017 for a review) and provide some guide to the 601	
likely direction and magnitude of any associated bias in estimated treatment effects. Of particular 602	
relevance, any Hawthorne effects present at baseline are likely to persist for the duration of our 603	
relatively short experimental protocol (Agerholm et al, 2008; Hultkrantz and Lindberg, 2011) and it is 604	
unlikely that a weakening of Hawthorne effects between baseline and experimental runs could 605	
account for the observed reductions in risky driving behaviours. For comparison between our four 606	
experimental conditions, any Hawthorne effects should be equivalent between groups but there 607	
remains the possibility that safer than usual driving during the baseline run (and experimental runs) 608	
may have limited scope for a behavioural response to incentives in the experimental run.  609	
Third, our tests of motivational crowding out relied on pre-post and between-group comparisons with 610	
respect to participation in the relevant behaviour. However, estimates of pre-post and between-group 611	
differences were the net effect of some participants moving from zero to positive levels of the relevant 612	
behaviour and a second group of participants moving from positive to zero levels of the relevant 613	
behaviour. In short, motivational crowding out in initially ‘safe’ drivers may have been wholly or 614	
partly offset (and disguised in the net effect on participation) by cessation of unsafe driving 615	
behaviours in others. We disaggregate this net effect by reporting numbers of participants moving in 616	
and out of participation for each outcome but sample size considerations precluded estimation of 617	
treatment effects in the sub-sample of initially ‘safe’ drivers (or estimation of interactions between 618	
treatment group and ATRD scores in our full sample). Repeating our experiment in separate samples 619	
of ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ drivers (e.g. with higher ATRD scores) may shed further light on the potential 620	
for motivational crowding out and response to treatment in different population sub-groups.     621	
Fourth, our tests of gain / loss asymmetry relied on comparisons between penalties and ‘otherwise 622	
equivalent’ rewards. While every effort was made to ensure that the penalties and rewards were 623	
described in neutral language and framed in a similar manner, some differences in wording between 624	
penalties and rewards were required in order to accurately describe the relevant incentive structure. It 625	
is possible that these minor differences in wording were partly responsible for our finding that 626	
penalties were more effective than rewards. If so, it is also possible that use of a different framing / 627	
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wording to describe penalties or rewards may have produced a smaller or larger effect than observed 628	
in the present study. While our results are consistent with the weight of evidence regarding loss 629	
aversion and gain / loss asymmetry (Knetsch & Wong, 2009), further research evaluating the impact 630	
of wording / framing effects may help to optimise presentation of both penalties and rewards.   631	
Fifth, while our results regarding motivational crowding out provide reassurance that we can avoid the 632	
perverse result of paying good money to achieve worse outcomes, we still need to set the incentive at 633	
a dollar-value sufficient to change behaviour but not so high as to compromise cost-effectiveness. 634	
Optimising the design of smart but lower-cost incentives therefore requires detailed information 635	
regarding the relationship between price and outcomes. Results suggest that, at least over the range 636	
considered in the present study, low-value and high-value incentives have much the same effect on 637	
speeding and swerving. Hultkrantz and Lindberg (2011) report similar results, finding no difference in 638	
effectiveness between a ‘low’ penalty of up to 1 SEK per minute of speeding and a ‘high’ penalty of 639	
up to 2 SEK per minute of speeding. The dollar-value of our low-value incentive was similar to 640	
(Dijksterhuis et al, 2015; Hultkrantz and Lindberg, 2011) or lower than (Mullen et al, 2015) the 641	
dollar-value of incentives offered in previous simulator studies. Despite this fact, even our low-value 642	
incentive would be unaffordable if converted to a dollar-value per minute of safe-driving and directly 643	
applied to policy-holders in PAYD insurance schemes. Along similar lines, Dijksterhuis et al (2015) 644	
note that “even very small rates of gain” in simulator studies would translate into “an unrealistically 645	
large amount of money… under a real PAYD system” (p103). Further research may therefore be 646	
required if our aim is to achieve the best balance between cost and effectiveness for very low value 647	
incentives in the simulator environment and for low value incentives in PAYD insurance.  648	
Sixth, findings from a number of previous studies suggest rewards are (unsurprisingly) preferred to 649	
penalties (e.g. Wit & Wilke, 1990; see also Dijksterhuis et al, 2015 for a brief review).  In the present 650	
study, ‘penalties’ were structured as the loss of an upfront payment deposited into a ‘safe driving 651	
account’; with the upfront payment designed to redress differences in acceptability between rewards 652	
and penalties. A similar approach has been employed in previous studies, with penalties framed as 653	
deductions from an upfront discount on the PAYD insurance premium (Bolderdijk et al, 2011). Under 654	
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this type of incentive structure, recruitment into an on-road trial of pay-as-you-speed (PAYS) 655	
insurance proved disappointing and the authors concluded that a 30% premium discount was 656	
insufficient to sell PAYS to young drivers (Lahrmann et al, 2012). The magnitude and framing of the 657	
upfront payment or discount is therefore crucial in ensuring acceptability of penalties embedded 658	
within PAYD insurance. In the present study, we found no differences in discontinuations from the 659	
experiment between penalty and reward conditions (see Figure 1). Nonetheless, further work will be 660	
required to adapt our penalties (deductions from a ‘safe-driving account’) for application in 661	
commercial PAYD insurance and to test acceptability of the resulting product in novice drivers.  662	
Finally, post-hoc power calculations suggested that the present study may have been underpowered to 663	
identify treatment effects relative to baseline for some outcomes. Replication of the present study 664	
using a larger sample size may provide more definitive conclusions regarding the design of ‘smart’ 665	
and potentially more cost-effective incentives for safe driving.  666	
5. CONCLUSION 667	
While it is well-known that incentives can influence behaviour, maximising the impact of incentives 668	
on specific behaviours, in specific populations requires detailed and context-specific evidence. This 669	
study provides fine-grained evidence to inform the design of ‘smart’ and potentially more cost-670	
effective incentives for safe driving in novice drivers. Our findings suggest that penalties may be 671	
more effective than rewards of equal value, such that it may be possible to exploit gain/loss 672	
asymmetry to amplify the effectiveness of financial incentives. Our findings also suggest that even 673	
low-value incentives can deliver net reductions in risky driving behaviours and that, at least over the 674	
range considered in the present study, low-value incentives have much the same effect on speeding 675	
and swerving as high-value incentives. Collectively, these findings would suggest that low-value 676	
penalties are likely to offer a more cost-effective means of reducing risky driving behaviour than 677	
high-value rewards. These design principles are currently being used to optimise the design of 678	
financial incentives embedded within PAYD insurance, with their impact on the driving behaviour of 679	
novice drivers to be evaluated in on-road trials (Stevenson et al, 2018).   680	
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